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Abstract
A theory of quantitative inference about the parameters of sampling
distributions is constructed deductively by following very general rules,
referred to as the Cox-Po´lya-Jaynes Desiderata. The inferences are
made in terms of probability distributions that are assigned to the
parameters. The Desiderata, focusing primarily on consistency of the
plausible reasoning, lead to unique assignments of these probabilities in
the case of sampling distributions that are invariant under Lie groups.
In the scalar cases, e.g. in the case of inferring a single location or scale
parameter, the requirement for logical consistency is equivalent to the
requirement for calibration: the consistent probability distributions
are automatically also the ones with the exact calibration and vice
versa. This equivalence speaks in favour of reconciliation between the
Bayesian and the frequentist schools of reasoning.
1 Introduction
A theory of quantitative inference about the parameters of sampling distri-
butions is formulated with special attention being paid to the consistency of
the theory and to its ability to make verifiable predictions. In the present ar-
ticle only basic concepts of the theory and their most important applications
are presented while details can be found elsewhere [1].
Let p(x1|θI) be the probability for a random variate x to take the value
x1 (to take a value in an interval (x1, x1 + dx) in the case of a continuous
variate), given the family I of sampling distributions, and the value θ of the
parameter that specifies a unique distribution within the family (for exam-
ple, a sampling distribution from the exponential family I, τ−1 exp {−x/τ},
is uniquely determined by the value of the parameter τ). An inference about
the parameter is made by specifying a real number, called (degree of) plau-
sibility, (θ|x1x2 . . . I), to represent our degree of belief in the value of the
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(continuous) parameter to be within an interval (θ, θ + dθ). Every such
plausibility is conditioned upon the information that consists of measured
value(s) x1, x2, . . . of the sampling variate and of the specified family I of
sampling distributions.
We assume all considered plausibilities to be subjects to very general
requirements, referred to as the Cox-Po´lya-Jaynes (CPJ) Desiderata [2,1],
focusing primarily on consistency of the plausible reasoning. The require-
ment of consistency can be regarded as the first of the requirements to be
satisfied by every theoretical system, be it empirical or non-empirical. As
for an empirical system, however, besides being consistent, it must also be
falsifiable [3]. We therefore added a Desideratum to CPJ Desiderata, requir-
ing that the predictions of the theory must be verifiable so that, in principle,
they may be refuted.
It should be stressed that in this way the list of basic rules is completed.
That is, the entire theory of inference about the parameters is built deduc-
tively from the aforementioned Desiderata: in order not to jeopardize the
consistency of the theory no additional ad hoc principles are invoked.
2 Cox’s and Bayes’ Theorems
Richard Cox showed [4] that a system for manipulating plausibilities is either
isomorphic to the probability system or inconsistent (i.e. in contradiction
with CPJ Desiderata). Without any loss of generality we therefore once
and for all choose probabilities p(θ|x1I) among all possible plausibility func-
tions (θ|x1I) to represent our degree of belief in particular values of inferred
parameters. In this way the so-called inverse probabilities, p(θ|x1I), and
the so-called direct (or sampling) probabilities p(x1|θI), become subjects to
identical rules.
Transformations of probability distributions that are induced by variate
transformations are also uniquely determined by the Desiderata. Let f(x|θI)
be the probability density function (pdf) for a continuous random variate x
so that its probability distribution is expressible as
p(x|θI) = f(x|θI) dx . (1)
Then, if the variate x is subject to a one-to-one transformation x −→ y =
g(x), the pdf for y reads:
f(y|θI ′) = f(x|θI)
∣∣∣dy
dx
∣∣∣−1 (2)
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(by using the symbol I ′ instead of I on the left-hand side of (2) it is stressed
that the above transformations may in general alter the form of the sampling
distribution). Since the direct and the inverse probabilities are subjects to
the same rules, the transformation of the pdf for the inferred parameter,
f(θ|xI), under a one-to-one transformation θ −→ ν = g¯(θ) is analogous to
the transformation of the sampling pdf:
f(ν|xI) = f(θ|xI)
∣∣∣dν
dθ
∣∣∣−1 . (3)
Once the probabilities are chosen, the usual product and sum rules [2]
become the fundamental equations for manipulating the probabilities, while
many other equations follow from the repeated applications of the two. In
this way, for example, Bayes’ Theorem for updating the probabilities can be
obtained:
f(θ|x1x2I) =
f(θ|x1I) p(x2|θx1I)∫
f(θ′|x1I) p(x2|θ′x1I) dθ′
. (4)
Here f(θ|x1I) denotes the pdf for θ based on x1 and I only (i.e. prior to
taking datum x2 into account), p(x2|θx1I) is the probability for x2 (the so-
called likelihood) given values θ and x1, while the integral in the denominator
on the right-hand side ensures appropriate normalization of the updated pdf
f(θ|x1x2I) for θ (i.e. the pdf for θ posterior to taking x2 into account).
Bayes’ Theorem (4) allows only for updating pdf’s f(θ|x1I) that were
already assigned prior to their updating. Consequently, the existing appli-
cations of our basic rules must be extended in order to allow for assign-
ment of probability distributions to the parameters, with such assignments
representing natural and indispensable starting points in every sequential
updating of probability distributions.
3 Consistency Theorem
According to the CPJ Desiderata, the pdf for θ should be invariant under
reversing the order of taking into account two independent measurements of
the sampling variate x. This is true if and only if the pdf that is assigned to
θ on the basis of a single measurement of x, is directly proportional to the
likelihood for that measurement,
f(θ|xI) =
pi(θ) p(x|θI)∫
pi(θ′) p(x|θ′I) dθ′
, (5)
where pi(θ) is the consistency factor while the integral in the denominator
on the right-hand side of (5) again ensures correct normalization of f(θ|xI).
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There is a remarkable similarity between the Bayes’ Theorem (4), ap-
plicable for updating the probabilities, and the Consistency Theorem (5),
applicable for assigning the probability distributions to the values of the
inferred parameters, but there is also a fundamental and very important
difference between the two. While f(θ|x1I) in the former represents the pdf
for θ prior to taking datum x2 into account, pi(θ) in the latter is (by con-
struction of the Consistency Theorem [1]) just a proportionality coefficient
between the pdf for θ and the appropriate likelihood p(x|θI), so that no
probabilistic inference is ever to be made on the consistency factor alone,
nor can pi(θ) be subject to the normalization requirement that is otherwise
perfectly legitimate in the case of prior pdf’s.
The form of the consistency factor depends on the only relevant infor-
mation that we posses before the first datum is collected, i.e. it depends
on the specified sampling model. Consequently, when assigning probability
distributions to the parameters of the sampling distributions from the same
family I, this must be made according to the Consistency Theorem by us-
ing the consistency factors of the forms that are identical up to (irrelevant)
multiplication constants.
4 Consistency Factor
According to (3) and (5) combined, the consistency factors pi(θ) for θ and
p˜i(g¯(θ)) for the transformed parameter g¯(θ) are related as
p˜i(g¯(θ)) = k pi(θ) |g¯′(θ)|−1 , (6)
where k is an arbitrary constant (i.e. its value is independent of either x or
θ), while g¯′(θ) denotes the derivative of g¯(θ) with respect to θ. However, for
the parameters of sampling distributions with the form I that is invariant
under simultaneous transformations ga(x) and g¯a(θ) of the sample and the
parameter space,
f(ga(x)|g¯a(θ)I
′)=f(x|θI) |ga
′(x)|−1=f(ga(x)|g¯a(θ)I) (7)
(i.e. when I ′ = I), p˜i and pi must be identical functions up to a multiplication
constant, so that (6) reads:
pi(g¯a(θ)) = k(a)pi(θ) |g¯
′
a(θ)|
−1 . (8)
Index a in the above expressions indicates parameters of the transformations
and k, in general, can be a function of a. In the case of multi-parametric
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transformation groups the derivative g¯′a(θ) is to be substituted by the ap-
propriate Jacobian.
The above functional equation has a unique solution for the transfor-
mations g¯a(θ) with the continuous range of admissible values a, i.e. if
the set of admissible transformations g¯a(θ) forms a Lie group. If a sam-
pling distribution for x is invariant under a Lie group, then it is necessarily
reducible (by separate one-to-one transformations of the sampling variate
x → y and of the parameter θ → µ) to a sampling distribution that can
be expressed as a function of a single variable y − µ, f(y|µI) = φ(y − µ).
Sampling distributions of the form σ−1ψ(x/σ) are examples of such dis-
tributions: by substitutions y = lnx and µ = lnσ they transform into
φ(y − µ) = exp {y − µ}ψ(exp {y − µ}) (the scale parameters σ are reduced
to location parameters µ).
It is therefore sufficient to determine the form of consistency factors for
the location parameter µ since we can always make use of (6) to transform
p˜i(µ = g¯(θ)) into the appropriate consistency factor pi(θ) for the original
parameter θ. Sampling distributions of the form φ(x − µ) are invariant
under simultaneous translations x→ x+ a and µ→ µ + a; ∀a ∈ (−∞,∞),
and the functional equation (8) in the case of the translation group reads
pi(µ+ a) = k(a)pi(µ) , (9)
implying the consistency factor for the location parameters to be pi(µ) ∝
exp {−qµ}, with q being an arbitrary constant. Accordingly, pi(σ) ∝ σ−(q+1)
is the appropriate form of the consistency factor for the scale parameters.
The value of q is then uniquely determined by recognizing the fact that
sampling distributions of the forms φ(x−µ) and σ−1ψ(x/σ) are just special
cases of two-parametric sampling distributions
f(x|µσI) =
1
σ
φ
(x− µ
σ
)
, (10)
with σ being fixed to unity and with µ being fixed to zero, respectively. The
consistency factor pi(µ) therefore corresponds to assigning pdf’s f(µ|σxI)
while pi(σ) is to be used when assigning f(σ|µxI). When neither σ nor µ
is fixed, however, the pdf (10) is invariant under a two-parametric group of
transformations, x → ax + b, µ → aµ + b and σ → aσ; ∀a ∈ (0,∞) and
∀b ∈ (−∞,∞), and the functional equation (8) for the consistency factor
pi(µ, σ) for assigning f(µσ|xI) reads
pi(aµ+ b, aσ) =
k(a, b)
a2
pi(µ, σ) , (11)
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so that pi(µ, σ) is to be proportional to σ−r, r being an arbitrary constant.
According to the product rule, f(µσ|xI) can be factorized as
f(µσ|xI) = f(µ|σxI) f(σ|xI) = f(σ|µxI) f(µ|xI) , (12)
where f(σ|xI) and f(µ|xI) are the marginal pdf’s, e.g.
f(σ|xI) =
∫
f(µ′σ|xI) dµ′ . (13)
The equalities (12) are achieved if and only if q = 0 and r = 1, i.e. if the
three consistency factors, determined uniquely up to arbitrary multiplication
constants, read:
pi(µ) = 1 and pi(σ) = pi(µ, σ) = σ−1 . (14)
5 Calibration
In order to exceed the level of a mere speculation, the theory of probabilistic
inference about the parameters must be able to make predictions that can
be verified (or falsified) by experiments. Let therefore a random variate x be
subject to a family of sampling distributions I and let several independent
values xi of the variate be recorded. The predictions of the theory are made
in probabilities
P (θ ∈ (θi,1, θi,2)|xiI) =
∫ θi,2
θi,1
f(θ′|xiI) dθ
′ = δ (15)
that given measured value xi of the sampling variate, an interval (θi,1, θi,2)
contains the actual value of the parameter θ of the sampling distribution.
For the sake of simplicity, the intervals are chosen in such a way that the
probabilities δ are equal in each of the assignments. The predictions are
then verifiable at long term relative frequencies: our probability judgments
(15) are said to be calibrated if the fraction of inferences with the specified
intervals containing the actual value of the parameter, coincides with δ.
An exact calibration of an inference about a parameter θ is ensured if
the assigned pdf f(θ|xI) is related to the (cumulative) distribution function
F (x, θ) of the sampling variate as
f(θ|xI) =
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂θF (x, θ)
∣∣∣∣ , (16)
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and the consistency factors pi(µ) and pi(σ) (14) do meet the above require-
ment. Furthermore, if besides of being calibrated (16), the pdf for θ is to
be assigned according to the Consistency Theorem (5), the distribution of
the sampling variate x is necessarily reducible to a distribution of the form
φ(y−µ) [5]. But exactly the same necessary condition was obtained by re-
quiring invariance of the sampling distribution under a Lie group, with such
an invariance being indispensable for determination of consistency factors
solely by imposing consistency to the assignment of pdf’s. Imposing logical
consistency to the theory is thus equivalent to imposing calibration to its
predictions: every probabilistic inference about a parameter of a sampling
distribution that we are sure is consistent will thus at the same time also
be calibrated and, vice versa, every calibrated inference, based on a poste-
rior pdf that is factorized according to (5), will simultaneously be logically
consistent, too. The equivalence of the two requirements speaks in favour of
reconciliation between the (objective) Bayesian and the frequentist schools
of reasoning, the former paying attention primarily to logical consistency
and the latter stressing the importance of verifiable predictions.
6 Consistency Lost and Regained
Numerous examples can be found with the sampling distributions lacking
invariance under Lie groups: there are sampling distributions for continu-
ous random variates (e.g. the Weibull distribution) that are not invariant
under continuous groups of transformations, the symmetry can be broken
by imposing constraints to parameter spaces of otherwise invariant sam-
pling distributions, or the sampling space may be discrete (e.g. in counting
experiments), just to name three of the most common ones. No consis-
tent qualitative parameter inference is possible in such cases, but under
very general conditions the remedy is just to collect more data relevant to
the estimated parameters. Then, according to the Central Limit Theorem,
the discrete sampling distributions approach their dense (Gaussian) limits,
the constraints of the parameter spaces become more and more irrelevant,
and the sampling distributions of the maximum likelihood estimates of the
inferred parameter θ gain Gaussian shapes with θ being the location param-
eters of the latter, so the ability of making consistent inferences is regained.
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7 Consistency Preserved
Consistency factors are determined exclusively by utilizing the tools such as
the product rule (12) and marginalization (13), that are deducible directly
from the basic Desiderata: in order to preserve consistency of inference it is
crucial to refrain from using ad hoc shortcuts on the course of inference. For
regardless how close to our intuitive reasoning these ad hoc procedures may
be, how well they may have performed in some other previous inferences,
and how respectable their names may sound (e.g. the principle of insufficient
reason or its sophisticated version - the principle of maximum entropy, the
principle of group invariance, the principle of maximum likelihood, and the
principle of reduction), they are all found in general to lead to inferences
that are neither consistent nor calibrated.
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